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Abstract
The e¤ects of discrimination of immigrants on the labour market are
studied within a search and wage-bargaining setting including a risk of
losing skills during the experience of unemployment. The negative e¤ects
of discrimination in the form of higher unemployment and lower wages
spread to all workers, immigrants and natives, in all sectors of the econ-
omy. The e¤ect is stronger for immigrants, but natives su¤er as well.
An increase in the share of immigrants in the economy exacerbates the
problem of discrimination.
1 Introduction
Labour market discrimination is a situation where individuals who are equally
productive are treated unequally - receive lower wages or face lower demands
for their services at a given wage - in a way that is related to an observable
characteristic, such as race or ethnicity.
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In 2003, 90% of the respondents to the Integrationsbarometer (Swedish
Integration Barometer), a survey carried out by Integrationsverket (Swedish In-
tegration Board), thought that immigrants are discriminated against in Sweden.
Furthermore, 9% of the respondents declared to have witnessed ethnic discrim-
ination at their own workplace. Field experiments provide further evidence for
the existence of discrimination. Carlsson and Rooth (2006) performed a eld
experiment in May 2005 to February 2006 that showed every fourth employer
to discriminate against men with Arabic sounding names in the hiring process.
Similar eld experiments nd evidence of discrimination in the selection of job
interviews in Australia (Riach and Rich (1991)) and in the USA (Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003)).
The present paper takes into account that, because of discrimination, workers
may end up in occupations below their qualications. The problem of discrim-
ination becomes more severe if workers are subject to the risk of losing skills
during the experience of unemployment. If a workers attachment to the labour
market becomes very fragile due to discrimination, then her skills potentially
deteriorate and the worker ends up searching for less qualied jobs. Hence,
discrimination may not only result in natives and immigrants getting di¤erent
pay for the same work but also in native and immigrants with similar skill levels
to end up in di¤erent occupations, if in any occupation at all. This issue has
previously been ignored in the theoretical literature.
Our purpose in this paper is to study theoretically the e¤ects of discrimi-
nation of immigrants on labour market performance for both natives and im-
migrants, given that all workers are subject to a risk of losing skills during the
experience of unemployment.1
We formulate a model of Becker-style taste discrimination within a search
and wage-bargaining setting. Even an employer who does not dislike immigrants
himself may think that it is against his interest to employ them if he expects
that co-workers and clients will disapprove of immigrants. Not all rms discrim-
1See Larsen (2001) for a related set-up but not distinguishing between immigrants and
natives.
2
inate against immigrants. For simplicity, we assume that neither job searchers
nor rms opening a vacancy know whether discrimination will take place before
the match. We motivate this by assuming that each rm has many interviewers,
some of which dislike immigrants. We assume that rms cannot observe if a par-
ticular interviewer has such discriminatory tastes. A discriminatory interviewer
does not o¤er a job to an immigrant. Discrimination implies that immigrants
face a lower probability of getting a job.
An alternative way of modelling discrimination is to assume that immigrants
are discriminated against when they separate from the job instead of upon
entry. An immigrant worker will then either be red or forced to resign due to
discrimination with a probability that is higher than that of a native worker.
This alternative set-up ts better with the assumption that neither job searchers
nor employers can observe whether discrimination will take place in a particular
rm. However, we believe that discrimination at entry is more common in the
labour market; moreover, the two modelling strategies yield qualitatively similar
results.
We assume for simplicity that all workers enter the labour market as skilled
workers. Unemployed workers face the risk of losing their skills. If this happens,
they can only search for jobs in the low productivity sector. Low productivity
workers may regain their skills by accumulating work experience or by training
when unemployed.
The model delivers the following results. Discrimination directly reduces an
immigrant workers transition probability out of unemployment and thereby de-
teriorates her wage-bargaining position. Discrimination therefore implies that
wages received by immigrants are lower than wages received by natives, even
when they face a non-discriminary employer. A lower hiring probability also im-
plies that immigrants su¤er higher unemployment rates, despite receiving lower
wages. By being unemployed more often, immigrants are subject to a higher
risk of losing their skills and the economy ends up with a higher proportion
of immigrants than natives in low productivity jobs. Not only are immigrants
a¤ected by discrimination, but all workers in the economy are.
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We perform comparative statics analysis where we analyse the e¤ect on all
workers of an increase in the level of discrimination and the share of immigrants
in the economy.
Finally, we endogenize the training decision which allows us to examine how
discrimination a¤ects the relative skill levels of natives and immigrants.
Related Research
Empirical evidence supports that employment below ones qualications and loss
of skill is an important issue to consider. Firstly, Arai et al (2000) compare the
percentage of immigrants in di¤erent occupations with the percentage of immi-
grants in the labour force in Sweden. Immigrants are overrepresented in only
three out of 29 occupations, all of which require no education or training.2 The
authors estimate the likelihood of getting a qualied job, controlling for the
years since immigration and the level of education. Immigrants born in the
other Nordic countries or in Western Europe have a 25% lower probability of
getting a qualied job than natives. The probability of getting a qualied job is
50% lower for immigrants born in Latin America and 70% lower for those born
in East Europe, Asia or Africa, than for natives. Secondly, Reitz (2001) shows
that the under-utilization of immigrant skills is signicant in Canada. Finally,
in an empirical study for Denmark, Nielsen et al (2004) show that a large frac-
tion of the wage gap between immigrants and natives would disappear if only
immigrants could nd employment and thus accumulate work experience.
Most of the existing theoretical models introducing discrimination in the
labour market emphasize two broad types of discrimination. The rst is preju-
dice, which Gary Becker formalizes as a tasteby at least some members of the
majority group against interacting with members of the minority group. The
2 Immigrants are overrepresented in handicraft (such as baker, butcher, tailor), service
work that requires no vocational education / training (such as salesman, cleaner, newspaper
distributor) and other work that requires no vocational education / training (such as unskilled
labour in building and construction and other factory work). The underrepresentation in all
other occupations is stronger for immigrants coming from Africa, Asia or Latin-America than
for those born in Europe.
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second is statistical discrimination by employers in the presence of imperfect
information about the skills or behaviour of members of the minority group.
Simple models of taste-based discrimination often predict the elimination of
discrimination through competition or segregation. Borjas and Bronars (1989)
and subsequent papers merge ideas from search models of the labour market with
Becker-style models of taste discrimination and obtain a number of important
results. Rosén (1997), Flabbi (2004) and our own model belong to this group.
The di¤erence between our model and the models of Rosén, Flabbi and Borjas
is that we incorporate in a thorough analysis of unemployment the risk that
workers potentially lose skills.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is set up. Section 3
incorporates the comparative statics. In section 4 we show the e¤ect of relaxing
simplifying assumptions and endogenize the training decision when unemployed.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We develop a model with two types of agents, workers and rms. Both workers
and rms are risk-neutral and innitely-lived and have a common discount rate.
Workers may be either employed or unemployed. To hire new workers, rms
must create a vacancy at a cost of k. Free entry drives the discounted prots
from creating a vacancy to zero.
The economy is divided into two di¤erent sectors, called h and l. Firms
in sector h require skilled workers with high productivity, while rms in sector
l can employ low productivity workers. The skills of workers are observable,
implying that low productivity workers never get a job o¤er in sector h:
The economy is populated by native and immigrant workers. The labour
force is normalized at one. The proportion of native workers, n, is exogenously
given.
In order to acknowledge that not all rms discriminate against immigrants
we consider the following set-up:
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 All rms have interviewers that meet job seekers, a proportion ds of which
dislike immigrants (s = h; l).
 When a discriminatory interviewer meets a skilled immigrant, she does
not get a job o¤er.
 Firms cannot observe whether their own interviewers discriminate against
immigrants or not. Neither job searchers nor the rm opening a vacancy
know whether discrimination will take place before the match.
 Firms and workers only know that, with a given probability ds (s = h; l; ) ;
an immigrant worker will not get a job, and a vacancy will not be lled
due to discrimination.
We assume for simplicity that all workers enter the labour market as skilled
workers. A more realistic set-up where we assume that a proportion of workers
are low skilled to start with, does not substantially modify the results. When
unemployed, skilled workers lose their skills with probability . Workers who
have lost their skills are only able to search for jobs in the low productivity
sector. Workers may regain skills in two di¤erent ways: i).they can train while
unemployed and become skilled unemployed, which happens at the rate  and
ii) they can get a low produvtivity job and regain their skills at rate a. For
simplicity,  and a are assumed to be exogenous and identical for natives and
immigrants. An alternative would be to let workers decide whether they want
to make an e¤ort to train and become skilled again. We consider this case in
an extension below.
2.1 Matching
Unemployed workers search for jobs in sector h or l; depending on their produc-
tivity level. The matching function for sector s is assumed to have the functional
form (vs)

(us)
1 
; where vs is the vacancy rate and us is the unemployment
rate in sector s = h; l and 0 <  < 1.
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A native worker with productivity s gets a job o¤er at rate fNs . The tran-
sition rate into employment for a native worker of productivity s is given by
fNs = f (s) = 

s ; s = h; l ;where s = vs=us captures sectorial labour mar-
ket tightness. An immigrant faces a discriminative interviewer with proba-
bility ds; so the transition rate into employment for an immigrant worker of
productivity s is reduced relatively to the transition rate of natives to f Is =
f (s) (1  ds) = s (1  ds) ; s = h; l. The rate at which vacant jobs become
lled is qs = q (1=s) = 
 1
s ; s = h; l.
2.2 Workers and rms
The arbitrage equations facing workers are given by
UJh = f
J
h
 
W Jh   UJh

+ 
 
UJl   UJh

; J = N; I: (1)
The present discounted value (PDV) of being an unemployed skilled worker of
origin j = N; I (natives or immigrants) is given by the likelihood that the worker
changes state. With probability fJh she gets a job in the high productivity sector
and receives the value W Jh and with probability  she loses skills and becomes
a low skilled unemployed with value UJl :
UJl = f
J
l
 
W Jl   UJl

+ 
 
UJh   UJl

; J = N; I: (2)
Low skilled unemployed workers get a job in the low productivity sector with
probability fJl and regain skills by training while unemployed at the rate . The
value of  is assumed to be exogenous but will be endogenized in an extension.
The present discounted utility for a skilled employed worker of origin J
satises
W Jh = w
J
h + 
 
UJh  W Jh

; (3)
where wjh is the wage received by skilled workers of origin j and  is the rate
of job separation, assumed to be the same for all workers. Similarly
W Jl = w
J
l + 
 
aUJh + (1  a)UJl  W Jl

: (4)
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We assume that, when workers separate from their jobs and join the pool of
skilled unemployed, they have regained their skills a the rate a. With probability
(1  a) ; workers join the pool of low skilled unemployed after separation.
The present discounted value of a vacancy in sector s is
Vs = qs
 
s
 
XNs   Vs

+ (1  s) (1  ds)
 
XIs   Vs

)
  k; s = h; l: (5)
qs is the likelihood that a rm matches with any worker, s is the proportion
of natives among the unemployed workers of productivity s and k is the cost of
opening a vacancy:With probability qss; the vacancy can be lled by a native
and provide a value XNs to the rm, while the probability of lling it with an
immigrant is qs (1  s) (1  ds) creating the value XIs :
Interviewers always hire the native worker they are matched with, but if they
are discriminative, they do not hire an immigrant. As a consequence, there is
a probability qs (1  s) ds that the vacancy is not lled at all. Firms would
prefer to avoid discriminative interviewers in this setting, but they can not as
this characteristic is not observable.
The PDV of a job occupied with a worker of origin j; Xjm satises
XJs = ys   wJs + 
 
Vs  XJs

; s = h; l and j = N; I: (6)
The productivities yh and yl and the exogenous separation rate  are as-
sumed to be the same for natives and immigrants. Free entry drives the value
of vacancies to zero in both sectors. Using equations (??) and (6) and set-
ting Vs = 0 we obtain two equations to determine labour market tightness, s
s = h; l:
gh = k
1
qh
(+ )  h

yh   wNh
  (1  h) (1  dh) yh   wIh = 0; (7)
gl = k
1
ql
(+ )  l

yl   wNl
  (1  l) (1  dl) yl   wIl  = 0: (8)
The matching function relates the rates at which vacant jobs become lled
to labour market tightness: Note that, for given wages, a rms outside option
deteriorates when there are many unemployed immigrants in the unemployment
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pool, that is when s is small. In the next subsection we derive equilibrium
wages which depend on labour market tightness through the transition rates
into employment.
2.3 Wages
Wages are determined by Nash Bargaining with bargaining power equal to one
half, so they are set to equalize the partiesoutside options,
W Js   UJs = XJs :
For the skilled workers the equalization implies the wage rate
wJh =
1
2
 
yh + U
J
h

; J = N; I; (9)
while, for the low skilled workers, the equilibrium wage is
wJl =
1
2
 
yl + U
J
l   a
 
UJh   UJl

; J = N; I: (10)
The wage of a low skilled worker decreases with a; the rate by which an em-
ployed worker separates from the present match having regained skills. The
possibility of regaining skills turns employment more attractive, so the worker
is willing to accept a lower wage in the bargaining process.
Substituting equation (2) into the wages of low skilled workers, we obtain
wJl =
1
2

yl + f
J
l
 
W Jl   UJl

+ 
 
UJh   UJl
  a  UJh   UJl 
For simplicity, we assume that  = a; that is, the rate by which a low
skilled worker moves to the pool of skilled unemployed by training during un-
employment equals the rate by which she enters that pool after separating from
a job where she regained skills. This assumption implies that the last two terms
in wJl cancel and the wages of low skilled workers become independent of the
transition rate of skilled workers. The model becomes recursive and we can
solve it analytically.
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By inserting the PDV from equation (1)-(4) in equation (9) and (10) and
solving the two equations we obtain:
wJl =
+  + fJl
2 (+ ) + fJl
yl J = N; I; (11)
wJh =

(+ ) (+ + ) + (+ ) fJh

yh + f
J
l
+s
2(+s)+fJl
yl
2 (+ ) (+ + ) + (+ ) fJh
(12)
where fNs = fs and f
I
s = fs (1  ds) ; s = h; l and J = N; I.
Proposition 1 Native workers receive higher wages than immigrants, wNs >
wIs ; s = h; l as f
N
s > f
I
s : Also, skilled workers, of either origin, receive higher
wages than low skilled workers, wJh > w
J
l ; J = N; I if fh > fl.
Wages are increasing in the transition rates out of unemployment. Due to
discrimination, skilled natives have a higher transition rate than skilled immi-
grants. This gives them a better bargaining position after a match, so they
receive higher wages. Skilled workers receive higher wages than low skilled
workers due to their higher productivity.
These equations together with equations (7) and (8), determine labour mar-
ket tightness for the two sectors, h = vh=uh and l = vl=ul.
A su¢ cient condition for the labour market tightness facing skilled workers
to be higher than that facing low skilled workers, h > l is that there is more
discrimination in the low productivity sector, dh  dl when the match e¢ ciency
 = 12 : This implies that it is easier for a skilled worker to nd a job than it is
for a low skilled worker, fh > fl, irrespective of country of origin. This is only
a su¢ cient condition and we can easily obtain fh > fl even if discrimination is
higher in the high productivity sector as long as the productivity di¤erence is
su¢ ciently large.
2.4 Unemployment
Steady state employment and unemployment for skilled and low skilled workers
are derived by considering the ows into and out of employment and the fact
that eNl + e
N
h + 
N
h + 
N
l = n and e
I
l + e
I
h + 
I
h + 
I
l = 1   n; where eJs
 
Js

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denotes employment (unemployment). We obtain the following unemployment
rates for immigrants and natives:
uNs =
Ns
eNs + 
N
s
=

 + fs
; s = h; l (13)
uIs =
Is
eIs + 
I
s
=

 + fs (1  ds) ; s = h; l (14)
Proposition 2 Immigrants face higher unemployment than natives in both sec-
tors. That is, the relative unemployment faced by immigrants relatively to na-
tives for both high and low skilled workers, uIh=u
N
h and u
I
l =u
N
l are higher than
one. The rate of unemployment facing skilled workers is lower than that expe-
rienced by low skilled workers as long as fh > fl.
Both skilled and low skilled immigrants face an additional negative impact
through discrimination, which increases unemployment of immigrants relatively
to unemployment of natives. This is easily seen using equations (13)-(14).
The proportion of native workers among the unemployed high and low pro-
ductivity workers are given by
h =
1
1 + (1 n)n 
; l =
1
1 + (1 n)n
(+fl)
(+fl(1 dl))
;
where we assume that  = a and dene  = +a(fh+)+a(fh(1 dh)+) > 1. The
additional negative impact of discrimination on low skilled workers results in
relatively more natives among the skilled unemployed, h > l.
We now consider some partial impacts on the proportion of natives among
the unemployed. When there are more immigrants searching for jobs, a lower
n; this directly reduces the share of native unemployed workers. If discrimina-
tion increases, a higher ds, there will be relatively more immigrants among the
unemployed workers. When labour market tightness increases, workerstran-
sition rates increase, reducing unemployment in particular for natives, as their
transition rate is higher.
The unemployment facing high productivity workers is
h = 
N
h + 
I
h =
na
+ ( + fh) a
+
(1  n)a
+ ( + fh (1  dh)) a
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and the unemployment facing low productivity workers is
l =
n
( + fl) (+ ( + fh) a)
+
 (1  n)
( + fl (1  dl)) (+ ( + fh (1  dh)) a)
The unemployment rate facing natives and immigrants are
uJ =
uJh + u
J
l
uJh + u
J
l + e
J
h + e
J
l
=

 
a
 
 + fJl

+ 
 
a
 
 + fJh

+ 
  
 + fJl
 ; J = N; I (15)
Discrimination reduces the transition rates for immigrants respect to natives,
f Is < f
N
s ; so that the unemployment rate facing immigrants is higher than the
one facing natives.
2.5 Skills
The di¤erence in unemployment rates derived in the previous subsection has
consequences for the distribution of skills.
Proposition 3 Due to discrimination, the proportion of low skilled immigrants
is higher than the proportion of low skilled natives in the economy.
Proof. The proportion of high productivity workers among immigrants and
natives are
Ih + e
I
h
1  n =
a ( + fh (1  dh))
(+ a (fh (1  dh) + )) ;
Nh + e
N
h
n
=
a ( + fh)
(+ a (fh + ))
:
We observe that
Ih + e
I
h
1  n <
Nh + e
N
h
n
;
Il + e
I
l
1  n >
Nl + e
N
l
n
:
Discrimination means that the proportion of skilled workers among natives
is higher than for immigrants and vice versa. In a model where natives and
immigrants enter the economy with the same distribution of skills, immigrants
become less skilled just because some interviewers refuse to o¤er them a job.
Note that this result is independent of whether we have discrimination of low
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skilled workers or not. This is due to the fact that the rate of regaining skills
during the unemployment spell is equal to the rate of regaining skills through
the spell of employment. On the other hand, if there is no discrimination of high
skilled workers, the proportion of natives and immigrants among both high and
low skilled workers are identical.
Next, we consider comparative statistics of an increase in the level of dis-
crimination and an increase in the share of immigrants in an economy where
some interviewers discriminate immigrants.
3 Comparative Statics
We will consider two di¤erent ways in which the labour market conditions of
workers are altered, an increase in the level of discrimination and an increase
in the share of immigrants in the economy. When labour market conditions
change, this a¤ects the bargaining position of a worker in the match. If her
position has been strengthened, because of a better outside option, then she
will be able to negotiate a higher wage. This is the direct e¤ect of the change.
But there is a rther indirect e¤ect. Firms get discouraged by the fact that at
least some workers require higher wages to accept the job and, therefore, they
o¤er less vacancies. This reduces labour market tightness and, therefore, the
probability that any worker in that sector (independently of the origin) gets
employed. Therefore, the indirect e¤ect a¤ects both natives and immigrants in
the sector.
In each of the following subsections we need to identify how the comparative
statics a¤ect the position of the di¤erent workers to assess the direct and the
indirect e¤ect they have on their wages and unemployment rates.
3.1 E¤ects of higher discrimination
In this section we perform comparative statics on the impact of an increase
in the share of discriminatory interviewers on the rates of unemployment, the
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distribution of unemployment, wages and the distribution of wages. The proofs
are easily derived by di¤erentiation.
The intuition behind the results is easier if we concentrate on discrimination
in a single sector at a time. First, we consider the case when discrimination
only appears in the high productivity sector. We will then describe the e¤ect of
an increase in the level of discrimination when it exists only in the low produc-
tivity sector. Last, we describe the e¤ect of having discrimination in the whole
economy. Empirical evidence is not conclusive with respect to which sector is
the most a¤ected by discrimination, but most theoretical papers assume that
the problem is more acute for skilled immigrants. 3
3.1.1 Discrimination of skilled workers
If discrimination is only present in the high productivity sector, it has no e¤ect
on the transition rates in the low productivity sector and the wage received by
low skilled natives equals that of low skilled immigrants, due to the simplifying
assumption ( = a) that makes the model recursive. Furthermore, the propor-
tion of natives among the unemployed is the same for skilled and non skilled
workers, that is, h = l; as low skilled immigrants are only a¤ected indirectly
by discrimination in sector h.
When only skilled immigrants are discriminated, the su¢ cient condition that
dh  dl to ensure that fh > fl no longer holds. If productivity di¤erences are
not su¢ ciently large, fh (1  dh) < fl is a possibility. In this case it would
be optimal for high skilled workers to search for low skilled jobs. In order to
rule out this possibility we therefore assume that productivity di¤erences are
su¢ ciently large so that fh (1  dh) > fl holds.
Proposition 4 All wages in the high productivity sector decrease whenever the
discrimination of skilled workers, dh, increases. Wages of low skilled workers
3 In a companion paper, Waisman and Larsen (2007), we show that well educated immi-
grants su¤er more than less educated immigrants when attitudes are more negative against
them. We interpret this result as evidence that discrimination a¤ects more the skilled workers.
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are not a¤ected. The relative wages of skilled immigrants and skilled natives,
wIh=w
N
h ; decrease.
As dh increases, the wages of skilled immigrants are reduced directly by the
deterioration in the bargaining position caused by higher discrimination and
indirectly by the lower transition rate faced by all skilled workers. Wages of
skilled natives are only a¤ected by the lower transition rates, so relative wages
of immigrants in the high productivity sector are reduced.
Due to the simplifying assumption that turns the model recursive, discrim-
ination in the high productivity sector has no impact on the labour market
tightness faced by low skilled workers. This implies that their wages are not
a¤ected.
Proposition 5 Unemployment of all skilled workers increase when discrimina-
tion of skilled workers, dh, increases. Skilled immigrants are more a¤ected than
skilled natives. Unemployment of low skilled workers is not a¤ected by dh:
The direct e¤ect of higher discrimination is that more skilled immigrants
become unemployed and risk losing their skills, which would imply that they join
the pool of low skilled unemployed. This direct e¤ect a¤ects immigrants only,
increasing their relative unemployment rate among skilled workers,
 
uIh=u
N
h

:
The indirect e¤ect is a reduction in the transition rates into employment for
all skilled workers when less vacancies are opened. At the same time, discrim-
ination conducted by some interviewers generates a reduction in wages which
provides a positive externality on rms with non discriminatory interviewers.
The rst impact dominates and the total impact on labour market tightness
is negative. Due to discrimination, natives are over-represented among skilled
workers and are more a¤ected by this negative indirect e¤ect.
The impact on skilled nativesunemployment is smaller than the total impact
on skilled immigrantsunemployment if
+ 
+ afh + 

dh
fh

dfh
ddh
+ 1 > 0
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If this is the case,
 
uIh=u
N
h

increases with dh: The relative unemployment rate
of low skilled vs high skilled workers decrease for both immigrants
 
uIl =u
I
h

and
natives
 
uNl =u
N
h

.
3.1.2 Discrimination of low skilled workers
Wages are a¤ected in the following way:
Proposition 6 All wages decrease whenever the discrimination of low skilled
workers, dl; increases. Relative wages of immigrant vs. native low skilled work-
ers, wIl =w
N
l ; decrease with discrimination.
Low skilled immigrants su¤er from both the direct and the indirect e¤ect of
discrimination. Low skilled natives su¤er only from the indirect e¤ect, hence
their wages decrease less than those of low skilled immigrants. More discrimi-
nation in the low productivity sector reduces vacancy supply and therefore the
outside option even for low skilled natives and for skilled workers, as they are
subject to a risk of losing skills. Skilled workersbargaining position is then
damaged and all skilled workers accept lower wages. The wage reduction in-
creases their transition rate, which in turn has a positive e¤ect on wages, but
this e¤ect is smaller than the wage reduction. The total impact on wages is
then negative for all skilled workers.
The impact on relative wages of immigrants vs native skilled workers, wIh=w
N
h ,
is ambiguous as there are several diverging e¤ects. As dl increases, there is a
direct negative impact on relative wages. In addition, high productivity sector
workerstransition rate increases, tending to decrease relative wages. Finally,
the reduction in the transition rate of low productivity workers has an ambigu-
ous impact on relative wages as immigrantswages already being lower dampens
the impact.
Proposition 7 When discrimination of low skilled workers, dl increases, un-
employment of skilled workers falls and the unemployment of low skilled workers
increases. The relative unemployment of immigrant vs. native low skilled work-
ers increases with dl.
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The direct e¤ect of higher discrimination in the low productivity sector is
that more low skilled immigrants can not get a job. But all low skilled workers
face higher unemployment due to the indirect e¤ect that reduces the transition
rates in this sector. This indirect e¤ect hits stronger the immigrants as they are
over-represented in the low productivity sector. The relative unemployment of
low skilled workers,
 
uIl =u
N
l

; increases with dl as a result of both the direct
and the indirect e¤ect.
When the value of being a low skilled worker decreases, all skilled work-
ers accept a lower wage in order to avoid losing skills during the experience
of unemployment: The lower wage makes skilled workers more attractive for
rms and therefore more vacancies are opened in the high productivity sector.
Hence, in this case the existence of discrimination in the low productivity sector
provides a positive externality on the high productivity sector by weakening
the skilled workersoutside option. This raises the labour market tightness in
the high productivity sector and therefore reduces the unemployment of skilled
workers. Hence, the discrimination of low skilled immigrants improves employ-
ment perspectives of all skilled workers.
The relative unemployment of immigrants
 
uIl =u
I
h

and natives
 
uNl =u
N
h

increase as uJl increases and u
J
h falls for J = N; I:
3.1.3 Discrimination in both sectors
When discrimination prevails in both sectors we can not obtain analytical results
any more and turn instead to numerical solutions. The parameter values chosen
(which are annual values) for this exercise are: the discount rate is set to  =
0:08; the separation rate is set to  = 0:08:(see Millard and Mortensen 1997); the
match e¢ ciency is assumed to be  = 0:5 (Pissarides 1995); yl is normalized
at one; yh is set equal to 1:3 to obtain a relatively large di¤erence between
productivity levels in the two sectors and hiring costs are assumed to be k = 0:6:
These costs are set in relation to the productivity of the high skilled workers
in order to generate reasonable unemployment rates. In Sweden in 2005 the
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fraction of natives was around n = 0:9 (www.scb.se).
The rest of the parameters are set to approximately match unemployment in
Sweden in 2005, u = 0:073 (www.oecd.org), the fact that the unemployment of
natives was 59% of the unemployment of immigrants (Integrationsverket 4) and
that the fraction of long term unemployed (more than 12 months of unemploy-
ment) was 19% (www.scb.se and www.oecd.org). In our model, the long term
unemployed correspond to the workers that have lost their skills. We assume
 = 0:25 and  = 0:08: This implies that a = = = 0:8: We assume in the
benchmark that one fourth of the interviewers discriminate immigrants in both
sectors5 . The table in Appendix 4 shows the wages and unemployment rates of
all workers in the economy as well as the share of skilled natives and immigrants.
We can start comparing our benchmark with an economy where immigrants
are not discriminated at all. Discrimination reduces all wages, increases the rates
of unemployment faced by all workers and reduces the share of skilled natives
and immigrants. But the negative e¤ect is much stronger for immigrants than
for natives. In our numerical exercise, immigrantswages are reduced by 3%,
while nativeswages are reduced by less than 0.1%. The rates of unemployment
faced by immigrants increase by more than 30%, while those faced by natives
increase by less than 1%. The share of skilled natives decreases by almost 5%
compared to less than 0.1% for natives. Natives are in this numerical analysis
only marginally a¤ected by discrimination.
The share of low skilled workers obtained in the exercise is close to the share
of long term unemployed workers in Sweden, that is, those workers who are
most likely to have lost their skills. Our numerical exercise shows that, due to
discrimination, immigrants end up being less skilled than natives even if they
entered the economy being as productive as natives. The share of skilled workers
would be smaller had we not assumed, for simplicity, that all workers enter the
economy being skilled. Furthermore,the di¤erence in the skill composition of
4http://ivpxweb.digitalinformation.se/Database/
/Integrationsverket/Arbetslivet/Arbetslöshet/Arbetslöshet.asp
5Consistent with the results by Carlsson and Rooth (2006).
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natives and immigrants would be larger if we had assumed that immigrants
enter the economy with low skills to a higher extent.
In the rest of this subsection, the benchmark with dh = dl = 0:25 consti-
tutes the basis from which we will study the e¤ect of increasing the level of
discrimination in one sector at a time.
Doubling of the share of interviewers that discriminate in the high produc-
tivity sector reduces the wages of skilled immigrants by 4% and increases the
unemployment rate they face from 6.63% to 9.77%. The unemployment rate
faced by skilled natives increases slightly from 5.05% to 5.14%. The reduction
in skilled nativeswages and the increase in the unemployment rate faced by
all low skilled workers are very small (they all change by less than 1%). The
share of skilled immigrants falls by almost 9%, while the share of skilled natives
decreases by only 0.3%.
The same increase in the level of discrimination in the low productivity
sector a¤ects mainly the low skilled immigrants, whose wages decrease by 5.3%
while the unemployment rate they face increases from 8.6% to 12.53%. The
unemployment rate faced by low skilled natives increases from 6.59% to 6.69%.
All other wages and unemployment rates change by 1% at the most. The share
of skilled workers, both natives and immigrants, increase slightly.
The simulations basically conrm the results derived in the previous subsec-
tions. In general, the e¤ect of an increase in the level of discrimination on the
wages has a smaller order of magnitude than the e¤ect on the unemployment
rates.
When we allow for di¤erent levels of discrimination in the two sectors we
nd the following additional results worth noting:
 When discrimination is higher in the low productivity sector, the relative
wages of immigrants vs natives are higher for the skilled workers and vice
versa, that is,
 
wIh=w
N
h

?
 
wIl =w
N
l

when dh 7 dl:
 When discrimination is higher in the high productivity sector, the relative
unemployment of immigrants vs natives is larger for the skilled work-
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ers than for the low skilled workers and vice versa, that is,
 
uIh=u
N
h

? 
uIl =u
N
l

when dl 7 dh:
 When discrimination is higher in the high productivity sector, the relative
unemployment of low skilled vs skilled natives is higher than that of low
skilled vs skilled immigrants and vice versa, that is,
 
uNl =u
N
h

?
 
uIl =u
I
h

when dl 7 dh:
3.2 E¤ects of higher share of immigrants
In this subsection we perform comparative statistics on an increase in the pro-
portion of immigrants in the population, while the total work force is still nor-
malized at one. If there is discrimination in one sector, then an increase in
the share of immigrants searching for a job in that sector makes vacancies less
attractive, as the probability that they will be lled is now smaller. We will
describe the e¤ect of an increase in the share of immigrants on wages and un-
employment rates. The proofs are easily derived by di¤erentiation.
3.2.1 Discrimination of skilled immigrants
Proposition 8 When the share of immigrants rises in an economy where only
skilled immigrants are discriminated, then wages received by all skilled work-
ers decrease. The impact on relative skilled wages across population groups is
ambiguous. Wages received by low skilled workers remain unchanged.
When there are more immigrants in the work force, the likelihood that a high
productivity rm with a discriminatory interviewer matches with one of them is
higher and this makes vacancies less attractive. The bargaining position of all
workers in the sector is weakened, so they accept lower wages. The reduction
in wages itself increases the transition rates for skilled workers, which in turn
leads to a smaller reduction in wages. The impact on the relative wages of
immigrant vs natives skilled workers
 
wIh=w
N
h

is ambiguous. When the high
productivity sector workerstransition rates increase, this tends to decrease the
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wages of immigrants relative to natives. However, this impact is modied due
to immigrantstransition rate already being the lower.
Due to the simplifying assumption relating the rates at which workers regain
skills, discrimination in the high productivity sector has no impact on the labour
market tightness faced by the low skilled workers. This implies that their wages
are not a¤ected.
Proposition 9 When the share of immigrants increases in an economy where
only skilled immigrants are discriminated against, the unemployment rate of all
skilled workers increases. The unemployment rate of skilled natives increases
relatively more than that of skilled immigrants. The unemployment of low skilled
workers remains unchanged.
When vacancies become less attractive, more skilled immigrants end being
unemployed. Note that the impact is purely a result of discrimination which
reduces the rate by which an open vacancy is lled and thereby reduces the
equilibrium number of vacancies supplied in the economy. The prevalent dis-
crimination means that skilled natives are working to a higher extent, so they
are more a¤ected by the reduction in the transition rates in the high produc-
tivity sector. As a consequence, the relative unemployment rate of immigrant
vs native skilled workers
 
uIh=u
N
h

decreases. The relative unemployment of low
skilled vs skilled workers
 
uJl =u
J
h

decreases for both natives and immigrants.
This is because uJl is constant and u
J
h increases for J = N; I:
3.2.2 Discrimination of low skilled workers
Proposition 10 In an economy where low skilled immigrants are discriminated
against, a higher proportion of immigrants, a higher (1  n), lowers wages re-
ceived by all low skilled workers. The impact on skilled workers wages and
relative wages is ambiguous.
An increase in the share of immigrants makes opening a vacancy in the low
productivity market less attractive. The fall in the transition rate of low skilled
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workers when less vacancies are opened deteriorates their bargaining position
causing them to accept lower wages. Even skilled workers are induced to accept
lower wages to avoid unemployment and the risk of losing skills, but the lower
wages themselves lead to an increase in the transaction rate that raises wages
again. The total e¤ect on skilled workerswages is ambiguous.
As natives are employed to a higher extent, they are more a¤ected by the
reduction in wages. But the fact that immigrantswages were already lower
dampens the impact. The e¤ects on relative wages for immigrant vs. native
skilled workers
 
wIh=w
N
h

and low skilled workers
 
wIl =w
N
l

are ambiguous.
Proposition 11 When the share of immigrants, (1  n) ; increases in an econ-
omy where only low skilled immigrants are discriminated against, the unemploy-
ment rates of all low skilled workers increase, while the unemployment rates of
all skilled workers fall. The unemployment of low skilled natives increases more
than the unemployment of low skilled immigrants. The relative unemployment
of skilled workers is kept unchanged.
Fewer vacancies reduce the transition rate of all low skilled workers and in-
crease their unemployment. As low skilled natives are employed to a higher
extent, they su¤er a higher increase in unemployment whereby the relative un-
employment rate for immigrant vs native low skill workers
 
uIl =u
N
l

decreases.
The fall in the transition rate of low skilled workers even deteriorates the
wage-bargaining position of skilled workers. Skilled workers accept lower wages
to avoid unemployment and the potential loss of skills. As there is no discrim-
ination in the high productivity sector, all workers there are equally a¤ected
by the indirect e¤ect, so relative unemployment for immigrant vs native skilled
workers
 
uIh=u
N
h

remains unchanged.
3.2.3 Discrimination in both sectors
The comparative analysis when discrimination is present in both sectors in only
possible in a numerical exercise. We start from the same benchmark dened in
subsection 3.1.3 and analyze two di¤erent increases in the share of immigrants
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in the economy: i) we double the share of immigrants and ii) we increase this
share by the same amount of percentage points as we increased the level of
discrimination. These two exercises allow us to compare the e¤ect on wages,
unemployment rates and skills of an increase in the share of immigrants with
the e¤ect of an increase in the level of discrimination.
A doubling of the share of immigrants in the economy decreases the wages
of all agents by 0.1% at most and increases the unemployment rates they face
by 0.6% at most. If the share of immigrants in the economy increases by from
10% to 35%, the wages of all agents still increase by 0.1% at most while the
unemployment rates increase by 1.2% at most. In both exercises the share of
skilled workers (natives and immigrants) decreases slightly.
Our numerical example shows that the e¤ect of an increase in the share of
immigrants has a much smaller order of magnitude than the e¤ect of an increase
in discrimination.
4 Extensions
4.1 Comparative analysis with  6= a
In the main text we have assumed that  = a as a devise to make the model
recursive. When we relax this assumption, wages in the low productivity sector
depend on the di¤erence in the value of being a high skilled vs a low skilled
unemployed according to the following equation:
wJl =
1
2

yl + f
J
l
 
W Jl   UJl

+ (   a)  UJh   UJl  : (16)
Let us compare to the case where  = a. When  > a the low skilled
workers outside option improves, as the probability of regaining skills is higher
while unemployed. This tends to increase the wages of low skilled workers.
When  < a; then the opposite holds: low skilled workers are more eager to
get a job as training opportunities are now relatively higher while employed.
The new equilibrium wages and shares of natives among the unemployed in
both sectors in the economy are presented in Appendix 1. The unemployment
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rates are dened by the same functions as before, they are only a¤ected through
the changes in the transition rates.
We now examine the impact on wages and unemployment of increasing the
probability of regaining skills in a numerical exercise where parameters have the
same values as in subsection 3.1.3. In the graphs in Appendix 2, we observe
that both wages and unemployment rates increase when the probability of re-
gaining skills when unemployed, ; increases for a given a. An increase in the
probability of regaining skills while unemployed raises the low skilled workers
outside option and increases the wages of low skilled workers. It also improves
the outside option of skilled workers as, if they happen to lose their skills, they
will more easily regain them and, furthermore, they face higher wages when
unskilled. A better outside option means that skilled workers get better wages
as well. Fewer vacancies are therefore created in both sectors.
The e¤ect of an increase in  is stronger for low skilled workers, as they
are more directly a¤ected. The stronger negative impact on labour market
tightness and therefore low skilled workers transition rate, implies that they
face a stronger increase in unemployment. Hence, a larger increase in the rate
by which low skilled workers regain skills induces a negative impact on workers
due to the increase in unemployment and a positive impact on workers due to
the increase in wages.
Simulations however show that relaxation of this simplifying assumption
changes little the e¤ect on wages and unemployment rates of an increase in
discrimination or the share of immigrants. The main di¤erence is that discrim-
ination in the high productivity sector now a¤ects low skilled workerswages as
well. When  > a; the wages received by low skilled immigrants fall, while wIl
was una¤ected by dh when  = a: The reduction in wages received by skilled
workers causes an increase in labour market tightness in the low productivity
sector which reduces low skilled workersunemployment. When  < a, wages
of low skilled immigrants instead increase with dh. This is the case as low
skilled workers are more eager to get a job when  < a because they regain
skills more frequently while employed than when unemployed. Therefore, when
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discrimination facing high skilled workers increase, their outside option deterio-
rates and they become relatively less eager to get a job which corresponds to an
improvement of their bargaining position. The wage induces a negative impact
on vacancy supply in the low productivity sector whereby labour market tight-
ness falls. The e¤ect on unemployment is however very small in our numerical
example.
4.2 Endogenous training
In the previous subsection we have showed the e¤ect on wages and unemploy-
ment of an increase in the exogenous rate at which skills are regained by an
unemployed low skilled worker. This rate was assumed to be identical for na-
tives and immigrants. We will now ask a di¤erent question. We would like to
know to which extent would low skilled unemployed individuals choose to train
and regain skills if they could do it at a cost and analyze how this decision is
a¤ected by discrimination.
We assume that low skilled unemployed individuals face di¤erent costs of
training every period. We think on this cost in terms of e¤ort. The exact amount
of e¤ort a worker needs in a particular period depends on the location and time
where this training is provided, whether she is healthy or sick, etc. These factors
vary over time, so the worker does not know in advance how costly it would be
for her to train. Each worker only knows the distribution of these costs in the
population, which is assumed to be the same for natives and immigrants. This
distribution determines the percentage of natives and immigrants choosing to
train, which is equal to the probability that each worker will regain her skills.
Once the choice to train becomes endogenous, immigrants will face di¤erent
probabilities of regaining skills than natives because discrimination alters the
value of skills.
Every period in which they happen to be low skilled unemployed, natives
and immigrants compare the value of skills with the cost of regaining skills they
face in that particular period and decide whether to train or not. Notice that a
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worker that chose to train because he had a low cost of training in one period
may instead have a very high cost next time he happens to get unemployed. The
costs a worker gets over time are completely independent. This is equivalent
to assuming that the low skilled unemployed draw costs from a lottery in each
period.
Let the distribution of the cost of training ci; be uniformly distributed be-
tween 0 and 1 and identical for natives and immigrants. The value of skills is the
same for all natives irrespective of the cost, and the same is true for immigrants.
All workers will choose to train if their cost is lower or equal to the value skills
have for them.
The value of regaining skills, for a given share of low skilled unemployed of
origin J that decide to train J ; is dened as
ZJ
 
J

= UJh
 
J
  UJl  J ;
= UJh
 
J
  
(+ sa)

2wjl   yl + saUJh
 
J

;
= 

2wJh
 
J
  yh  
(+ sa)

2wjl   yl + sa
 
2wJh
 
J
  yh
=

(+ sa)

2wJh
 
J
  yh  2wJl  J  yl	 :
Workers choose to train as long as ZJ > ci: Let bcJ be the cost of the
marginal low skilled unemployed of origin J that chooses to train, so that ZJ =bcJ : Given that ci is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 for J = N; I; the
proportion of workers of origin J that choose to train is equal to bcJ : We have
until now called this proportion J : This means that the equilibrium condition
that determines the optimal proportion of low skilled unemployed choosing to
train is ZJ
 
J

= bcJ = J : The optimal proportion is then solved as a xed
point:

(+ sa)

2wJh
 
J
  yh  2wJl  J  yl	 = J ; J = N; I: (17)
Incorporating equation (17) to the model for natives and for immigrants, we
can solve for the optimal choice in our numerical exercise.
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If discrimination prevails in the high productivity sector, skills are more
valuable for natives than for immigrants, so they choose to train to a larger
extent. Consequently, N > I when dh > 0 and dl = 0: If discrimination
exists instead in the low productivity sector only, then the value of being able
to regain skills is the highest for the low skilled immigrants. Training means
that they can escape the sector where they are discriminated against and move
into a sector where productivity is larger and where they are as likely to get
jobs as natives. This means that I > N when dl > 0 and dh = 0.
The graphs in Appendix 3 show the results of the comparative statics analysis
of increasing discrimination in one sector at a time in the presence of discrim-
ination in both sectors when the decision to train is endogenous. We assume
that ds = 0:25 in the sector where discrimination is constant.
As discrimination in the high productivity sector increases, the value of skills
decreases for all workers, so less of them choose to train. The e¤ect is much
stronger for immigrants that su¤er discrimination directly. When dh > dl;
then N > I : When dh is much lower than dl; then I > N : But natives
choose to train to a higher extent than immigrants already when dh < dl: The
reason for this is that discrimination has a larger impact on wages in the high
productivity sector than in the low productivity sector as wages in the high
productivity sector are relatively higher.
As discrimination in the low productivity sector increases, the value of skills
increases for all workers. As a consequence, more workers of both origins choose
to train. The e¤ect is much stronger for immigrants that su¤er discrimination
directly. When dl is low relative to dh; then N > I : When dl is much larger
than dh;then I > N : But natives choose to train to a higher extent than
natives still when dl > dh; until the di¤erence in discrimination becomes high
enough. This is the case for the same reason as above: discrimination has a
larger impact on wages in the high productivity sector than in the low produc-
tivity sector as wages in the high productivity sector are relatively higher.
The numerical analysis shows that, when the same level of discrimination
prevails in both sectors dl = dh = 0:25 and the share of immigrants increases,
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the e¤ect of dh prevails and the value of skills decreases for all workers. This
means that less workers of both origins choose to train and the optimal share is
higher for the natives than for immigrants for all shares n:
5 Conclusion
We formulated a model of employer discrimination within a search and wage-
bargaining setting, where workers are subject to a risk of losing skills during the
experience of unemployment. We allowed low skilled workers to regain skills
both during employment and during training while unemployed. We assumed
that discrimination takes the form of a share of interviewers that refuses to
o¤er a job to immigrants. We then analyzed the equilibrium implication of
discrimination and how the economy responds to higher discrimination facing
high and low productivity workers and a larger share of immigrants.
Discrimination directly reduces an immigrant workers transition out of un-
employment and thereby deteriorates her outside option in the wage-bargaining
situation. Consequently, discrimination causes wages received by immigrants
to be lower than wages received by natives, even when immigrants face a non-
discriminatory employer. A lower transition rate also implies that immigrants
su¤er higher unemployment rates, despite receiving lower wages. As immigrants
experience more unemployment they also face a higher risk of losing their skills.
Therefore, the economy ends up with a higher proportion of immigrants than
natives in low productivity jobs.
When discrimination increases in the high productivity sector, unemploy-
ment increases and skilled sector wages fall. Skilled immigrantslabour market
outcomes are a¤ected to a larger extent than natives. The share of skilled
immigrants decreases more than that of skilled natives.
When the share of discriminatory interviewers in the low productivity sector
increases, low skilled workers face lower wages and higher unemployment. Low
skilled immigrants are again worse hit by discrimination than low skilled natives.
However, skilled workers accept lower wages facing a worsened outside option
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and thereby the unemployment rate they face falls. More discrimination in the
low productivity sector enhances the share of skilled natives and immigrants.
An increase in the share of immigrants in the economy exacerbates the neg-
ative impacts on labour market performance due to discrimination. If discrimi-
nation could be eliminated, then an increase in the share of immigrants would
have no e¤ect in this model.
Finally, we endogenized the decision to train in order to regain skills while
unemployed. When only high skilled workers face discrimination, then skills
are more valuable for natives as they are more likely to keep them. Therefore
more natives than immigrants choose to train and regain skills. If, instead, low
skilled workers are subject to discrimination, then immigrants value skills more
than natives as skills allow them escape discrimination. Hence, relatively more
immigrants than natives regain skills.
Even when we assume that discrimination exists only in one sector of the
economy, its negative e¤ects spread to all workers in both sectors. The e¤ect is
stronger for immigrants, especially those that are directly discriminated against,
but natives su¤er as well, even if they work in the sector in which discrimination
is absent. Holding skills allowing you to apply for jobs in the sector where there is
no discrimination and/or holding the rightethnicity do not o¤er full protection
against the negative consequences of discrimination.
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In Section 4, subsection 4.1, we relax the assumption that  = a: This turns
the model non-recursive and makes it impossible for us to obtain analytical solu-
tions for the comparative statistics. But we can still solve the model numerically.
The equilibrium wages when  6= a are:
wJl =
8<:
  
2 (+ ) (+ + ) + (+ ) fJh
  
yl
 
+  + fJl

(+ + ) + (   a)  fJh yh   fJl yl

  (   a) fJh
 
yh
 
(+ ) (+ + ) + (+ ) fJh

+ fJl yl

9=;


;
wJh =
8<:
 fl
 
yl
 
+  + fJl

(+ + ) + (   a)  fJh yh   fJl yl
+
   
2 (+ ) + fJl

(+ + ) + fJl (a  )
  
yh
 
(+ ) (+ + ) + (+ ) fJh

+ fJl yl
 
9=;


;
where 
 =
8<:
   
2 (+ ) + fJl

(+ + ) + fJl (a  )
   
2 (+ ) (+ + ) + (+ ) fJh
 
 fJl (   a) fJh
9=;
The shares of natives among the unemployed becomes:
h =
1
1 + 1 nn
(+afl(1 dl))
(+afl)

; l =
1
1 + 1 nn 
;
where
 =
(( + fl)+ ( + fh) ( + afl))
( + fl (1  dl))+ ( + fh (1  dh)) ( + afl (1  dl)) :
The unemployment rates are dened by the same functions as before, they
are only a¤ected through the changes in the transition rates.
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Appendix 2
E¤ect of an increase in the probability of regaining skills when unemployed, ;
when discrimination prevails in both sectors (dh = dl = 0:25):
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Appendix 3
Comparative statics when the decision to train is endogenous.
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